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THE DIVERGENCE OF BLACK AND WHITE MARRIAGE PATTERNS

Abstract

Our purpose in this paper is first, to examine patterns of first marriage among black
and white women in the United States, and then, to assess the various factors that underlie
these patterns.

Three major differences exist between the first marriage patterns of black

and white women: lower proportions of blacks marry than whites, the proportion of women
who ever marry has declined substantially across cohorts of black women but comparatively
modestly across cohorts of white women, and increased education is associated negatively, if
only slightly, with the probability of ever marrying among white women, but is associated
positively among black women. The observed racial divergence of marriage patterns is
demonstrated to be consistent with three factors differentially experienced by blacks and
whites: the marriage squeeze, labor market success, and out-of-wedlock childbearing.
Our a.nalysis of the marriage squeeze indicates that, given the traditional range of age

differences between spouses, there is a greater mismatch in terms of sheer numbers of women
and men among blacks than among whites for cohorts born prior to the late 1950s. Along
economic lines, we find that an individual's employment status is positively associated with
the propensity to marry and that the labor market situation of less-educated young black
men and women is generally poor and has deteriorated significantly with the passage of time
in comparison to other groups in the United States. Last, we provide evidence that having
an out-of-wedlock child at an early age is strongly negatively associated with the likelihood
that a woman will ultimately marry.

INTRODUCTION
For some time there has been an awareness that marriage rates, and family formation
in general, have differed between whites and blacks. In 1965, the Moynihan report touched
off a lengthy debate concerning the nature of differences between white and black families. It
saw black family structure disintegrating and the black community enmeshed in a "tangle of
pathology" (Moynihan 1965).
There were a number of objections to this view, including (a) its attribution of the
"pathological" behavior of lower-class black families to individuals rather than to defects in
the social system, (b) the view of family structure as the cause of black-white inequality
(Rainwater and Yancey 1967), and (c) the adoption of an attitude of "blaming the victim"
(Hill 1972). Some sought to show that although differences between white and black family
structure exist, these are small when one controls for socioeconomic differences (Heisse 1975).
Stressing the basic sameness of black and white families, this approach assumes that marriage
is valued to a high degree among blacks but factors such as higher rates of unemployment
prevent marriages from taking place or contribute to their dissolution. Another perspective
holds that black families ought not to be viewed as deficient simply because their structures
tend not to conform to the norms of the white middle class (Hill 1972; Nobles 1979), but
instead ought to be seen as a unique cultural form valid on its o,vn terms. Both of these

approaches question the use of the nuclear family as a standard against which black families
ought to be compared. Rather, to a certain extent each argues that the extended family
characterizes many families and therefore merits attention in its own right.
Each of the perspectives rejects the pathology model of black families and argues that
within the extended family structure there may be incentives and pressures not to form
families along nuclear lines and, in particular, to reject marriage (Aschenbrenner 1973;
Martin and Martin 1978; McAdoo 1978; Stack 1974).
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Although there has been a resurgence of interest in comparing black and white family
structure, discussion has moved away from the debate over the "pathology" of black families.
Some claim it has been resolved in favor of a position that views them as resilient and
creative in the face of adversity (Farley and Allen 1987). Wilson and Neckerman (1986) note
that the focus during the 1970s on refuting the pejorative characterizations of the black
family, while important, effectively diverted scholarly attention from the effects of larger
economic processes on family structure - effects, they argue, that must now be addressed.
In general, the impetus behind contemporary research on black-white differentials
comes from two sources. Patterns of marriage and family formation have changed
dramatically in recent years. Many of the trends - such as the declining rates of first
marriage of women over the past 25 years or so, or the sharp decrease in the proportion of
the population living in husband-wife families during that same period (see, e.g., Espenshade
1986) - have been much more acute for blacks than whites. These changes raise questions
about whether marriage as a social institution continues to hold its preeminence in American
family life and whether its importance differs for whites and blacks.
In addition, a concern of much current work on the family is the connection between
family composition and economic well-being (e.g., Moynihan 1986; Weitzman 1985; Wilson
and Neckerman 1986) ...A.gain, certain patterns disproportionately characterize blacks . ~v'.lany

observers, for example, are alarmed at the rising proportion of children born out of wedlock
and the rapid growth of female-headed families. Because members of such families are at
high risk of being poor, many authors argue that it is imperative to examine the causes
behind these trends (Bane 1976; Edelman 1987; Wilson 1987). Here, it may be especially
illuminating to consider declining marriage rates and the reasons behind them because these
families are increasingly headed by single, never-married women, rather than divorced,
widowed, or separated women (Darity and Myers 1983).
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In the present paper, we consider questions about how black and white Americans
differ with respect to patterns of entry into first marriage and how various social, economic,
and demographic factors give rise to the racial differences observed. Our analysis focuses on
marriage rates and reveals much sharper black-white differences than previously identified.
Many prior analyses are inadequate because they rely on period or cross-sectional measures,
which provide little insight into the behavioral patterns that they presumably summarize.
These measures fail to describe the marriage process from its most natural perspective,
namely, the life course or cohort perspective.

THE MODEL
We apply the Coale-McNeil marriage model (Coale and McNeil 1972; described in
detail in the Appendix) to cohort data on marriage patterns of black and white women of
various educational attainment levels. Coale (1971) observed the existence of an empirically
regular structure in the pattern of entry into first marriage for female cohorts in a wide range
of countries and time periods. In addition, Coale showed that the structure of these patterns
could be well summarized by three parameters: the mean age at first marriage (µ ), the
standard deviation of age at first marriage ( o'), and the proportion ever-marrying in the
cohort ( E). Examples of the wide variety of first marriage patterns that can be captured by
the Coale-McNeil model are displayed in Figure 1.
By applying this model, we are able to infer the mean age at marriage and the
proportion of women who will ultimately marry from survey data on cohorts that have yet to
complete their marriage experience. That is, because the model is parametric, we can fit the
model to the marital history experienced to date by a young cohort and then extrapolate the
remainder, or the future course, of that cohort's marital history. Bloom and Bennett (1988)
have shown, using artificial truncation experiments in which the model is fit to several
4

purposely age-abbreviated data sets, that the model performs well in extrapolation. Thus by
fitting the model to recent survey data, we can estimate how marriage patterns have changed
across cohorts.

THE DATA
Our analysis of marriage patterns of American women is based on data from the June
1985 Current Population Survey (CPS). The CPS is a nationwide sample survey conducted
monthly by the Bureau of the Census. It involves detailed personal interviews in about
60,000 households during which information on a variety of demographic, social, and
economic variables is recorded.
In the June 1985 CPS, the survey included a marriage and fertility history
supplement. Included on the supplementary survey instrument was a question on age at first
marriage that was asked of all women aged 18 and above. Unfortunately, there are few
covariates in the CPS that could sensibly be hypothesized to be associated with age at
marriage. However, we have coded the following two variables: race (black, white) 2 and
education at the time of the survey (less than high school, high school graduate, more than
high school). Although the CPS data set permits estimation of only two covariate effects, it
is extremely useful in this study because it refers to a nationally representative sample of all

women and includes an exceptionally large number of observations.

THE DIFFERENTIAL EXPERIENCE OF MARRIAGE IN THE LIFE COURSE
In Table 1 we demonstrate that American patterns of marriage differ critically
depending upon whether one is focusing on blacks or whites and, furthermore, that these
patterns have not been stable over time. Among white women, the proportion of those born
in the late 1930s (i.e., those in their late forties at the time of the survey) who could expect
5

never to marry was approximately five percent. This proportion has nearly doubled for the
corresponding cohort of women born fifteen years later, to a level of about nine percent. The
mean age at which these cohorts of women could expect to first marry increased from 21.0 to
21.9 years of age.
Among black women, the likelihood of marriage also decreased, but to a much greater
degree. Approximately 11 percent of those born in the late 1930s are expected never to
marry. That proportion has increased dramatically to one-quarter for the cohort born in the
early 1950s. The corresponding increase in the mean age at first marriage for these cohorts,
from 21. 7 to 22.5 years of age, is similar to that among white women.
We would be mistaken if we were to believe that all individuals within a particular
race behave similarly with respect to their propensity to enter into marriage or the time at
which they do so. Table 2 again reports parameter estimates associated with four cohorts of
women for blacks and whites separately. However, for each cohort we allow the mean age at
first marriage, the standard deviation of the age at first marriage, and the proportion who
will ever marry to vary with educational attainment.
Once again, differences exist between black and white marriage patterns and over
time these patterns have tended to diverge. Consider first the group of women who did not
have a high school degree at the time of the survey. The percentages expected to ever marry
have fallen across cohorts for both white and black women. Ninety-five percent of white
women born in the late 1930s are expected to marry at least once in their lifetime, with a
mean age at first marriage of 20.0 years. Approximately 91 percent of their counterparts
born 15 years later are expected to marry and, on average, at roughly the same age, 19. 7
years. The same comparison for black women yields the following figures: The mean age at
first marriage decreased across cohorts only trivially, from 21.0 to 20.8 years. More
importantly, however, the proportion of women ultimately expected to marry plummeted
6

from 84 to 69 percent.
Education, as expected, bears an important relationship to the parameters of the
marriage distribution. For both blacks and whites, higher education is associated with a
higher mean age at first marriage among those who eventually marry. White women born in
the early 1950s who have had more than a high school education are expected to marry at
23.3 years of age or 3.7 years later, on average, than those who have not graduated high
school. Among blacks of this birth cohort, the direction of the association is the same, with a
difference between the groups of 2.6 years. The magnitude of the difference in timing
between the educational groups is generally less among blacks than whites.
A surprising finding, however, concerns the relationship between educational
attainment and proportions ever-marrying. For the most educated group of women,
education is consistently positively associated with proportions marrying among blacks, but
negatively associated among whites. Furthermore, the race differential in the magnitude of
the education-marriage incidence relationship is just the reverse of that found in the
education-marriage timing relationship. The magnitude of education differentials among
whites is small, 3 while it is quite a bit larger among blacks. For example, there is only a
three percentage point difference between the least- and most-educated white women born in
the late 1930s, in contrast to the ten point difference among black women.

THE INCREASING SIGNIFICANCE OF RACE
Traditionally, marriage has been considered one of the steps in the life-cycle that
signifies the transition to adulthood (Hogan and Kitagawa 1985). However, it appears that
for certain groups of women, the path to adulthood is now less likely to be characterized by
marriage than it was previously. Black women are less likely to marry than white women,
particularly among the least-educated. Furthermore, we find a divergence in marriage
7

patterns between the races as time progresses.
These results raise two important questions: (1) How can we account for the lower
rate of marriage found among black women, and (2) Why have marriage rates declined faster
among blacks than whites, thus giving rise to the divergence of marriage patterns? In order
to address these issues, we consider various arguments that might account for trends and
differentials in nuptiality.

The Marriage Squeeze

First, the issue of imbalances in male-female ratios provides a partial clue to
understanding the racial differences in proportions marrying. Declining marriage rates for
both white and black women are commonly attributed to a marriage squeeze. One aspect of
the squeeze relates to the fact that at some age women begin to outnumber men in the
population. The sex ratio imbalance occurs several years earlier in life among black women
than among white women, in part reflecting not only a sex ratio at birth among blacks that
is lower than that among whites, but also the relatively high rates of death and incarceration
among young black men. Further compounding the squeeze is the fact that women have
traditionally tended to marry slightly older men.
The squeeze is exacerbated among blacks because the black population has grown
faster over time than the white population. If we examine the time series of births for blacks
and for whites during the period 1945 to the peak of the baby boom, 1957, we find that white
births increased at a continuous rate of about 2.1 percent per year while the rate was almost
twice that for black births, 3.8 percent per year. For those women who were born during the
upward trend of births in the early and mid-1950's, there are simply too few men in the older
cohorts comprising the traditionally-defined pool of potential marriage partners. The results
of Table 1 are consistent with what we might expect in the presence of a baby-boom induced
8

marriage squeeze. We would expect, and indeed do find, fewer women marrying in the
cohorts we observe who were born after the Second World War (those in their thirties at the
time of the survey) as compared with those women who were born just prior to the war
(those in their late forties at the time of the survey) when the trend in births was essentially
flat.
It further clarifies matters to briefly examine the 1980 census counts of blacks and
whites. For illustrative purposes, suppose that women consider men two years older than
themselves to be "marriageable" partners. Thus, 20 year-old women would look toward the
pool of 22 year-old men for their potential spouses. Figure 2 shows the ratio in 1980 of men
aged x+2 to women two years younger, at age x. (We have adjusted the census counts for
estimated enumeration errors.) At virtually all ages 35 and under among whites, there exists
either an approximate balance of men and women or a relative surplus of men. In contrast,
however, among blacks there appears to be a significantly skewed sex ratio for women over
18 years of age. Indeed, the ratio of males to females is higher among whites for all but three
of the single-year ages between 0 and 40 (2 to 42 among males).
An alternative approach is to examine the size of a male birth cohort relative to the
female cohort arriving two years later. In other words, what is the ratio of the number of
male births occurring in year t (the future pool of potential husbands) to the :nurr1ber of

female births occurring in year t+2 (the future pool of potential wives)? Figure 3 shows this
ratio for the period spanning 1946 through 1973 for the cohorts reflecting (albeit only very
roughly) the future husbands, and the corresponding birth years reflecting the cohorts of
future wives (i.e., births taking place in 1948 through 1975). We calculate this ratio
separately for whites and blacks.
As anticipated, there is a greater mismatch in terms of sheer numbers of women and
men among blacks than among whites for these cohorts. We see that black women born
9

prior to the late 1950s generally face a dearth of black men. 4 Parenthetically, one might
note that, should current norms regarding the age difference between spouses continue, there
generally will be a "surplus" of men in the marriage market for women born between 1960
and 1975.
We should emphasize that the above analysis does not take into account the known
fact that there is a wide range of differences between the ages of wives and husbands.
However, despite the obvious crudity of this exercise, we may conclude that black women
face a shortage of men that is considerably more severe than that experienced by white
women.
Others have used different means to estimate the number of potential mates that
exist in a population. Wilson (1987) assumes that men must be employed to marriageable.
Using a "male marriageable pool index", defined as the number of employed men per one
hundred women of the same age and race, he finds that for white women the ratios of
available men remained roughly the same between 1960 and 1980. This held true for all four
regions of the country. For black women, however, the ratios declined significantly for all
ages everywhere except in the West. While having a job may be somewhat too stringent a
criterion when considering the number of eligible males in the population, the index is
undoubtedly useful in helping to explain the rapid decline ir1 black female marriage rates. It

also highlights the fact that there is a social and economic element to the marriage squeeze in
addition to the purely demographic component.

The Relative Economic Situation of Blacks and Whites
Economic variables can play an important role in explaining patterns of marriage.
Many have explored the existence of a causal link between male unemployment and lower
marriage rates (Center for the Study of Social Policy 1984; Edelman 1987; Glick 1981;
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Moore, Simms, and Betsey 1986; Reid 1982; Stack 1974).
The relative levels of black and white male unemployment and earnings is a
particularly promising area of inquiry. However, many of the studies that attempt to
examine unemployment patterns of blacks and whites do not account for variation in
educational attainment and thus assume homogeneity within racial groups. This limits their
value in trying to assess whether changes in unemployment can help to explain the lower
marriage rates of black women, especially those with a lower level of education.
We estimate a few simple regression models in order to determine not only how blacks
have fared economically relative to whites in recent years, but also whether economic trends
and differentials by race covary with educational attainment. Economic data are obtained
from the March Current Population Surveys of 1968 through 1986. In particular, we
examine two dependent variables: (1) unemployment rates, U, and (2) average annual per
capita earnings of those employed full-time year-round, E (in natural logarithms).
Table 3a focuses on 20 to 24 year-olds since these are the years during which a large
proportion of women and men marry. Two sets of regression coefficients are reported for
each sex, corresponding to the two dependent variables. The independent variables in all
models include all main effects, and two-way and three-way interaction effects of race
(black=l, white=O), education (less than, equal to, and more than high school graduate), and
time. Dummy variables for all but one year were incorporated in the model as well in order
to control for business cycle effects, secular trends, etc., although the corresponding
coefficients have been omitted from the table.
It is apparent that, for both sexes, unemployment has increased substantially over
time among blacks and the less-educated, relative to whites and those who are better
educated. Similarly, expected annual earnings of all males in the labor force are increasingly
losing ground among blacks and those less-educated relative to other groups. Less-educated
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women of both races have lower earnings, although no decline over time is apparent. Less
educated black men appear to be singled out for particularly low earnings, invariant to time.
As shown in Table 3b, supplementary regression analyses referring to 25 to 29 year-olds paint
much the same picture. In short, Table 3 tells a dramatic story: Less-educated young black
men and women appear to be doubly jeopardized by their race and educational status. Their
relative economic circumstances are generally poor and have deteriorated significantly with
the passage of time. 5
A growing body of literature suggests that these young men and women who are most
disadvantaged in terms of education and employment form part of a black "underclass".
This is an urban population that is lacking in skills, education, and employment, is
permanently disaffected from the mainstream labor market, and has little hope of upward
mobility (Auletta 1982; Edelman 1987; Hogan and Kitagawa 1985; Wilson and Neckerman
1986). Typical avenues of advancement are closed off to this group because educational
criteria are increasingly important for mobility and because structural changes in the post
war economy have entailed declining employment prospects, especially in the manufacturing
sector, in central cities where blacks are concentrated. Such a dynamic prevents this group
from moving out of poverty (Harrington 1984; Wilson 1978 1987). An expanding underclass,
then, whose members are unable to accumulate sufficient resources for marriage, would
contribute heavily to explaining the sharply declining rates of marriage among black women.
The impoverished situation of the underclass is posited to lead to family structures
that are alternatives to marriage. In particular, the reliance on kin networks and extended
families, and the incidence of out-of-wedlock births, although generally more prevalent among
black women than white, are more common among the poorest black women than those of
higher classes. These factors in turn may explain part of the decline in marriage among black
women.
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Black women seeking a stable form of familial organization may rely on a network of
kin that pools and exchanges economic resources rather than on marriage (Aschenbrenner
1973; Stack 1974). If a young woman's potential marriage cannot offer her more security
than can her present kin network, then she may see little reason to marry (Martin and
Martin 1978). Stack's (1974) study of a midwestern black community noted that while
participation in help networks was an important way of coping with extreme poverty, it
sometimes was not conducive to marriage. The study cited the example of women who in
each case were dissuaded from marriage by members of networks who were fearful that it
would mean losing the resources and contributions of the woman considering marriage.
Empirically speaking, the connection that we have drawn thus far between an
individual's employment and earnings status and his or her marriage prospects has been
merely implicit in nature. In order to verify this connection, we compare annual probabilities
of marriage in a given year among women and men who were employed full-time year-round,
and those who were unemployed for any duration, in the prior year (including "discouraged
workers"). This comparison is made using data referring to the 1979 Youth Cohort of the
National Longitudinal Surveys of Labor Market Experience. The baseline sample consisted of
12,686 individuals aged 14 to 21 years on January 1, 1979, nearly all of whom were surveyed
annually through 1986. Individuals who were in school the preceding year or who were ever
married by December 31 of that prior year are excluded from the analysis.
In Figure 4 we show the proportion of never-married, out-of-school, 19 to 22 year-olds
who married in 1980 classified by whether they experienced some time either unemployed or
involuntarily out of the labor force in 1979. Next, we follow that cohort and determine the
proportions marrying in 1981 among those who were still never-married as of December 31,
1980 and who did and did not experience some time unemployed or out of the labor force in
1980. This analysis is carried out through 1985.
13

Figure 4 indicates that an individual's employment status is positively associated with
whether he or she marries. Furthermore, the incidence of marriage is more sensitive to
employment status for blacks than for whites. As an example, among black men who were
employed full-time year-round, the annual probability of marriage (conditional upon being
never-married at the beginning of the year) during the period 1980 through 1985 averaged
.070. In contrast, the probability of marriage among black men experiencing some spell of
unemployment or time out of the labor force averaged only .036. The corresponding pair of
probabilities pertaining to white men are .097 and .088. It might be noted that Wilson's
male marriageable pool index implicitly assumes that it is the man's economic circumstances
that drive the marriage process. The present analysis suggests that a woman's current
employment status, as well as that of a man, bears importantly on her subsequent marital
status.
Individuals who wish to marry and who fare poorly in the labor market may have
lower marriage rates because, among other possible reasons, they are perceived to be
relatively undesirable marriage partners or because they are less able to establish their own
households. Alternatively, some argue that their lower marriage rates are the result of some
low-income women with young children avoiding formal marriage in an effort to maintain
their welfare eligibility. For example, eligibility for Aid to Families with Dependent Children
(AFDC) is generally restricted to low-income female-headed families with children under age
18. Ellwood and Bane (1985) have presented evidence indicating that AFDC allows women
who are not currently married but who do have children to set up their own households.
However, without estimates of a formal model of the impact of AFDC on the likelihood of
first marriage - which surprisingly has not been addressed in the literature on the connection
between AFDC and family structure (see Blackburn and Bloom 1987 or Hoffman 1988 for
detailed reviews of this literature) - it is not possible to distinguish between these alternative
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views.

Currently, there is no direct evidence that would suggest that AFDC serves, in

effect, as a surrogate husband, thereby depressing marriage rates.

Out-of-Wedlock Childbearing
The role of out-of-wedlock childbearing in the decline of marriage rates must also be
considered. Although there is ample evidence in the literature that both out-of-wedlock
childbearing and decreasing marriage rates are a consequence of the declining ability of young
men to support families (Wilson and Neckerman 1986), we examine out-of-wedlock births
here to assess explicitly their association with marriage propensities. We hypothesize that a
woman who has an out-of-wedlock birth is less likely ever to marry than one who does not.
To many individuals, one reason for marrying is to start a family; if a woman already has
children, then this impetus to marry may be lessened, or even removed. Alternatively, a
woman will have children outside of marriage if she perceives marriage as having insignificant
net benefits. In addition, potential spouses may be less likely to consider marrying a woman
with children because of the added emotional and financial burdens such a marriage may
entail.
Using data from Cycle III of the National Survey of Family Growth, we show in
Figure 5 the proportion of ,x1omen aged 30 to 44 in 1982 ,vho ,vere ne'vrer-married and
childless at age x ( each of the single-year ages from 14 through 19) and who eventually
married by age 30, classified into two categories: (1) those who had an out-of-wedlock first
birth at age x, and (2) those who did not. Clearly, never-married women who had an out-of
wedlock first birth at ages 14 through 19 were considerably less likely to be married by age 30
than those who had not. For example, about 11 percent of never-married 16 year-olds who
did not have an out-of-wedlock birth at that age had not married by age 30. Among never
married 16 year-olds who had an out-of-wedlock first birth at age 16, almost three of ten had
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not married by age 30.
Given that having children outside of marriage is associated with a lower likelihood
that women will marry, it is instructive to look at the patterns of childbearing that
characterize black and white women. Black women have always been more likely to give
birth outside of marriage, although recently the gap between the two groups has narrowed as
the out-of-wedlock birth rate for whites has increased at every age while it has fallen for black
women. However, the gap between the two groups remains substantial. For example, in
1982, the rate of out-of-wedlock births per thousand women was 22.2 for white women aged
25 to 29, while the corresponding figure among black women was 85.5 (Moore, Simms, and
Betsey 1986).
Out-of-wedlock childbearing, like extension among families, is more common among
blacks than whites. Here again, however, there are substantial class differences. Women of
the black underclass are more likely to have an out-of-wedlock birth (Evans 1986; Wilson
1987). As we show in Figure 6, premarital childbearing disproportionately occurs among
women of less-educated parents. 6 For example, about 22 percent of black women aged 15 to
19 whose mothers were not high school graduates had a premarital first birth versus only five
percent of the corresponding group of women whose mothers had more than a high school
education. Insofar as parent's education correlates ,vith class, the results indicate that having

a child out of wedlock is closely related to class. This is consistent with the findings of Hogan
and Kitagawa (1985) indicating that lower class black women are more likely to have such a
birth than those of the middle and upper classes and with the work of Moore, Simms, and
Betsey (1986) who found that black women with less than a high school education are more
likely to give birth premaritally than those with high school or more education.
There are a number of reasons, in addition to the economic arguments, why out-of
wedlock births may be more common among the underclass. Having goals for the future is
16

inversely related to early fertility (Moore, Simms, and Betsey 1986) and the poor quality of
schools in ghetto neighborhoods may not be conducive to cultivating high aspirations (Hogan
and Kitagawa 1985). Some contend that higher rates of illegitimacy among black women are
related to lower stigma attached to out-of-wedlock childbearing (Bernard 1966; Furstenberg
1976), with those of lower class backgrounds having a less negative attitude than others
(Zelnik, Kantner, and Ford 1981).
The timing of first intercourse also plays a role. Those who initiate sexual activity at
very early ages are less likely to be efficient contraceptors than women who are older when
they first have sexual relations. Although the gap between the age at first intercourse
between black and white teenagers is narrowing, black teenagers are still somewhat more
likely to be sexually active than their white counterparts (Hofferth, Kahn, and Baldwin
1987). Black teenagers of lower social class begin having sex earlier than those of higher class
backgrounds. In addition, Hogan and Kitagawa (1985) show that upper class black teenagers
are more likely to be efficient contraceptors; they are more likely to use contraception at first
intercourse and are more likely to use it subsequently.

THE BETTER-EDUCATED WOMAN
.~
. number of other factors come into play ,vhen ,ve consider the declining marriage

rates of better-educated women. Work has become more central to the lives of women, both
single and married, than it previously was. Most young women today can expect to work
throughout their adult lives. Recognizing this, they may postpone marriage in order to
attain the education and resources needed for advancement in the labor market.
For a variety of reasons, postponing marriage may induce more women to remain
single. Leaving the family home in favor of an independent existence, which is related to
delayed marriage, may reduce women's orientations to family roles as they begin to enjoy the
17

independence afforded by living on their own (Waite, Goldscheider, and Witsberger 1986).
Women pursuing employment may begin to perceive trade-offs between marriage and their
careers even if they are initially inclined toward marriage (Cherlin 1980). Work and
education are also strong predictors of nontraditional attitudes toward sex roles and the
division of household labor (Mason, Czajka, and Arbor 1976; Parelius 1975; Regan and
Roland 1985). If women with such attitudes are unable to find spouses with compatible
views, they may decide to remain single.
Working for pay also allows women the financial option not to marry. Lower rates of
marriage among women with great resources (education, income, etc.) may indicate that such
women use their resources to "buy out" of marriage (Goldscheider and Waite 1986).
Cultural assumptions by both men and women about the desirable educational level
of a spouse may also be informative. If men and women feel that wives should have a lower
educational status than their husbands, then some among the growing numbers of highly
educated women of both races may be becoming either less willing to marry or, in some sense,
less marriageable.
For relatively well-educated women of both races, the arguments outlined above may
explain why they have experienced lower marriage rates in the younger cohorts. However,
the question still remains: Why do black women in this group have substantially lower
marriage rates than similarly educated white women, yet higher rates than less-educated
black women?
Black women with higher levels of education are still affected by the same shortage of
black men that was noted in our discussion of less-educated black women. Numerous studies
have argued that this is a cause of lower black marriage rates (Cox 1940; Guttentag and
Secord 1983; Reid 1982). For highly educated black women there may be a shortage of
"suitable" partners, insofar as emphasis is placed on similar levels of educational attainment.
18

Recall our argument that holding traditional assumptions about the appropriate education
level of a spouse may put well-educated women at a disadvantage in terms of marrying. It is
notable that black women have been more likely to be affected by such a dynamic than white
women. Historically, among whites, men have outnumbered women with respect to the
number of those who receive college degrees. College degree recipients among black women,
however, have long outnumbered those among black men. It is only recently, by the mid1980s, that parity between the sexes within each race has been achieved (U.S. Bureau of the
Census 1988).
The issues of extended families and out-of-wedlock childbearing, which we showed to
be negatively associated with marriage rates, are also pertinent to the discussion of better
educated black women. Although these phenomena may, in part, be an adaptive response to
poverty, some contend that they also are driven by cultural forces. Thus, while they are
most common among less-educated black women, they are also more prevalent among middle
class black women than white women (Farley and Allen 1987; Moore, Simms, and Betsey
1986). For example, the number of births per thousand unmarried women aged 18 to 44 in
1981 for those with more than a high school education was 34.0 among blacks but 5.8 among
whites; at incomes in excess of $20,000 per year, the rates were 48.3 and 8.6 for black women
and white women, respectively (Moore, Simms, and Betsey 1986).

SUMMARY AND DISCUSSION
The analysis presented herein indicates that there is no simple explanation for
declining marriage rates of women across cohorts and for differences in rates by race. Across
every cohort-education group for which we can compare whites and blacks, the proportion of
black women who are expected to ever marry is smaller than the corresponding proportion of
white women. There are a number of factors - social, demographic, economic, and perhaps
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cultural - that play a part in explaining differences in marriage patterns, but these do not
affect all women in the same fashion.
Black women seeking to marry may be hindered simply by sheer numbers of available
men. A marriage squeeze that is more severe for blacks than whites results from a depressed
sex ratio in the ages at which marriages tend to occur. High rates of death and incarceration
of young black men contribute to the sex ratio imbalance and most likely disproportionately
affect the poorest and least-educated groups. For better-educated black women, a scarcity of
"suitable" partners may be partially the result of greater numbers of black women than men
completing higher education.
The relationship between educational attainment and marriage rates is particularly
noteworthy. There is a negative, if only slight, association between education and marriage
among white women. On the other hand, better-educated black women tend to be more
likely to ever marry than blacks who do not graduate high school. However, the positive
relationship between education and the propensity to marry among blacks may be viewed, in
large part, as stemming from the exceptionally low marriage rates of less-educated blacks.
Among women with less education, the percentages who will ever marry differ sharply
by race. The proportion of white women expected to ever marry has decreased from 95 to 91
percent for the oldest and youngest cohorts, respectively. Across cohorts of black women,
however, the likelihood of ever marrying has fallen precipitously. Only 69 percent among the
youngest cohort are already married or can expect to marry. This may be partly a reflection
of the poverty experienced by many blacks in this group, which makes it more difficult to
enter into a secure marriage. The extended family structure may be a more stable form of
familial organization for many poor black families than the nuclear structure, which, in effect,
may discourage women from marrying unless marriage can offer them greater economic
security.
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Our economic analysis reveals that unemployment and average annual earnings are
worsening among less-educated black men and women in recent years relative to other
subgroups of the population. This deteriorating economic situation hints at the expansion of
a black underclass, whose members would most likely find it difficult to afford marriage. The
erosion of economic opportunity among less-educated blacks is consistent with the sharply
declining marriage rates that we observe. Indeed, we demonstrate that a never-married
individual who is unemployed or involuntarily out of the labor force for any ~uration in a
given year is substantially less likely to marry in the subsequent year than a counterpart who
has been employed full-time year-round.
The analysis presented here allows us to consider a number of issues concerning the
centrality of marriage in American life. For many young women, it appears that marriage
plays a less significant role in the transition to adulthood than it did just one generation ago.
It is thus not possible to make a categorical statement that marriage remains a state that
most women will enter at some point in their adult lives. The prevalent view that 90 percent
is a historical minimum of the proportion of adults who will eventually marry (Cherlin 1981)
must be qualified. Neither is it possible, however, to say that Americans are abandoning
marriage as a social institution. Survey data indicate that the overwhelming majority of
Americans continue to feel that marriage is desirable. On balance, we would agree with those
who see formal marriage as a weaker institution than it once was (e.g., Davis 1986) and as
occupying a less central place for blacks than for whites (Rodgers and Thornton 1985).
Broad statements about the role of marriage in society today fail to acknowledge the
very different paths by which various groups of women have come to remain unmarried. Nor
do they tell us whether those paths have been taken by choice or have been involuntarily
imposed. Resolving these issues is critical if we are to have a better sense of whether trends
toward lower marriage rates will continue or will reverse themselves; in turn, we shall better
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understand the ramifications of these trends.
It is apparent from our analysis that the transition that has taken place in the
marriage patterns of American women over the past few decades is not likely to proceed
smoothly into the future. First, the relative scarcity of males that has contributed to the
female marriage squeeze has begun to reverse itself - both for blacks and whites. Thus,
"marriageable men" will become increasingly abundant, which should tend to boost female
marriage rates. Second, the United States economy is just beginning to undergo a major
transition from being a labor surplus economy to being a labor shortage economy. This
transition is partly a consequence of the baby bust generation coming of working age and
partly a consequence of the inevitable slowdown in the growth of women's labor market
activity. As labor markets tighten over the remaining years of this century, unemployment
rates should decline and workers should be able to command higher wage and salary
compensation. As the economic outlook for men and women brightens, an important barrier
to marriage for many will be removed. Consequently, marriage rates may be expected to
increase as the labor market becomes more of a sellers' market.
The fact that the demographic and economic factors that seem to have been
responsible in part for the transition over the past few decades in American marriage patterns
a.re now shifting gear provides a sound basis for thinking that further changes will yet occur.
Along these lines, one might actually expect there to be some return to pre-baby boom
marriage patterns.
However, it is important to recognize that neither demography nor economy should
be deemed to be destiny. Other factors surely impinge on the marriage process. We should
note that (a) as men adapt to the new roles of women and, in particular, adopt a more
accepting, egalitarian view towards the workforce participation of women, and (b) as the
public and private sectors recognize the need to accommodate the changing nature of
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American families (e.g., by way of the provision of child care and parental leave), some of the
existing disincentives associated with marriage may be diminished. On the other hand, we
may witness more and more women rejecting marriage in favor of other paths now open to
them.
Last, we must underscore the fact that post-war changes in norms and expectations
regarding marriage, out-of-wedlock childbearing, and family structure, and the extent to
which the underclass is insulated from the demographic and economic changes that are now
taking place, act in concert to confound our effort to predict the direction of trends in
marriage, much less the extent and speed with which a transition will take place. The issue
of whether and how fast marriage behavior changes is an important one. Further research
will help us to determine the relative strength of each of the several forces that influence this
behavior, and only then will we be able to better assess the future course of American
marriage patterns.
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APPENDIX: The Coale-McNeil Marriage Model

The Coale-McNeil marriage model is based on the observation by Coale (1971) that
age distributions of first marriages are structurally similar in different populations. As shown
by Coale, these distributions tend to smooth, unimodal, skewed to the right, and have
density close to zero below age fifteen and above age fifty.
Coale also observed that the differences in age-at-marriage distributions across female
populations are largely accounted for by differences in their means, their standard deviations,
and their cumulative values at the older ages, for example, age 50. The particular form of
the model that we shall use, which characterizes any observed distribution, was derived by
Rodriguez and Trussell (1980):

g(a)

~ 1.2813 exp{-1.145[a-;;µ

+ 0.805]

-

exp[-1.896(a-;;µ

+ 0.805)]},

(1)

where g(a) is the proportion marrying at age a in the observed population and µ, u, and E
are, respectively, the mean and standard deviation of age at first marriage (for those who
ever marry) and the proportion ever marrying.
It is interesting to note that Coale and McNeil's model distribution of first marriage
by age (e.g., equation (1)) arises as the convolution of an infinite number of mean-corrected
exponential distributions whose parameters increase in arithmetic sequence. Moreover, Coale
and McNeil (1972) have shown that this distribution is very closely approximated by the
convolution of the three exponential distributions with the largest exponents (in the infinite
sequence) and a normal distribution. This latter property of the Coale-McNeil model gives
rise to an appealing behavioral interpretation of the model. According to this interpretation,
each of the three exponential distributions characterizes the waiting time between two
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premarital stages (i.e., between the commencement of dating and ultimately meeting one's
spouse, between meeting the spouse and engagement, and between engagement and
marriage); the normal distribution describes the age of entry of women into the marriage
market. This interpretation received some empirical support in the original paper by Coale
and McNeil in a direct test using data on the length of time that a sample of French
husbands and wives knew each other before marrying.
Subsequent research, however, has done little to confirm or deny the behavioral
interpretation of the model. Nevertheless, a number of studies have provided additional
support for the ability of the model to fit first marriage data (see, e.g., Bloom and Bennett

1988; Ewbank 1974; Rodriguez and Trussell 1980; Trussell 1980; Trussell and Bloom 1983).
To some extent, the good fit may be due to the flexibility of three-parameter models to fit
distributions that are smooth, unimodal, and skewed to the right. It is also likely that the
Coale-McNeil model performs well because it is based on the marriage rates for an actual
population. In other words, even though the true model generating a given distribution of
marriage rates is unknown, the Coale-McNeil model may fit well (and better than a purely
theoretical model such as that due to Hernes (1972) or a purely ad hoc empirical model such
as that due to Keeley (1979)) because the true model is captured implicitly in the rates on
which it (i.e., the Coale-McNeil model) is based.
The parameters of the above equation may be estimated in a variety of ways
depending on the nature of the available data. In the present application we work with
survey data on age at first marriage for individual women and use a maximum likelihood
estimator. Thus, for our sample of all women (i.e., a random sample of ever-married and
never-married women in a cohort), we will estimateµ, u, and Eby maximizing the following
log likelihood function:
log LA

-~ log g[af
1EM

I µ,u,E] +

I:_ log [1-G( af I µ,u,E )]
iEM
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(2)

where af is the age at first marriage for each individual, i, who has married (the set M), af
is the age at the time of the survey for each never-married individual (the set M), and G( ·) is
the cumulative distribution function for the density function g( ·) expressed in equation (1).
The second summation on the right hand side of equation (2) accounts for censoring which
will be present to the extent that not all women who ultimately do marry will have done so
by the time of the survey.
Following Trussell and Bloom (1983), we extend this model to allow for covariate
effects by specifying a functional relationship between the parameters of the model
distribution and a set of covariates. For example, we may specify these relationships in linear
form as follows:

µ.l

x!a
l

(1.

y!13
l

l

E.l

w!,
l

where Xi' Yi, and Wi are the vector values of characteristics of individual, i, that determine
respectively, µi, <Ti' and Ei' and where a,

/3, and

estimated.
I

I
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'Y are the associated parameter vectors to be

NOTES

1An earlier version of this paper was presented at the meetings of the American
Sociological Association, Washington, DC, 28 August 1985, and the Population Association
of America, Boston, MA, 30 March 1985. We would like to thank Robert Fay, Sanders
Korenman, Kathy London, Martin O'Connell, Paul Schultz, Arland Thornton, and three
anonymous reviewers for their helpful comments and McKinley Blackburn, William
Cunningham, Margaret Greene, Susan Kelley, and Cecilia Rouse for excellent research
assistance. This work has been supported in part by a grant from the Rockefeller
Foundation's Gender Roles Program.

2 There are too few women of other races in the 1985 Current
Population Survey to
adequately analyze their marriage patterns.

3 Due to the relatively small sample size of black women
with a college degree, we
employ the category, education greater than a high school degree. For the sake of
comparability, we use the same categorization for white women, although it should be noted
that such a classification strategy does mask group variation in marriage rates among women
with more than a high school degree.

4 If the increase in births taking place during the 1950s
were operating alone, that is,
without the discrepancy in the number of males and females that exists at the time of birth,
then white females born in a given year over this period would have outnumbered their male
counterparts born two years earlier. However, the sex ratio at birth among whites
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(approximately 1.05) offsets this would-be majority of females.

5 It should be noted that these dependent variables refer
to individuals in the labor
force. If educational attainment of blacks relative to whites improved over time, and if those
individuals with the best labor market prospects were those attending school, then the
estimates in Table 3 would be misleading. We explored this possibility by estimating models
that included school enrollment rates as an independent variable, but found no support for
this hypothesis.

6 The story behind Figure 6 is much the
same when we examine father's education.
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Table 1:

Parameter estimates using the Coale-McNeil marriage model based on data referring
to black women and white women, June 1985 Current Population Survey.*
(Standard errors are in parentheses.**)

White

Black
Period of Birth

Early

Late

Early

Late

Early

1940s

1930s

1950s

Late
1940S

Early

~

1940s

1940s

Late
1930s

µ Constant 21.86

21.62
(.06)

21.24
(.07)

20.99

22.51

21.95

(.07)

(.07)

(.25)

(.20)

22.88
(.29)

21.73
(.27)

4.26
(.06)

4.12
(.06)

3.88
(.05)

3.96
(.06)

5.17
(.24)

4.44
(.17)

5.66
(.25)

5.38
(.24)

.907
(.005)

.937

.957

.750
(.018)

.814
(.016)

.885

(.003)

.951
(.004)

.869

(.004)

(.015)

(.015)

(1'

Constant

E Constant

* µ refers to the mean age at first marriage for those in the cohort who ever marry; u, to the standard
deviation of the age at first marriage; and E, to the proportion of women in the cohort who are expected to
ever marry.
** All coefficients significant at the .05 level.

33

Table 2:

Parameter estimates using the Coale-McNeil marriage model with covariates, June 1985
Current Population Survey. (Standard errors are in parentheses.)

Black
Early
~

Late
1940s

Period of Birth
Late
Early
1930s
1950s

Early
1940s

Late
~

Early
1940s

Late
1930s

Constant

19.66** 19.81** 19.63** 19.97**
(.15)
(.15)
(.14)
(.15)

20.81** 21.58** 21.91** 21.02**
(.47)
(.49)
(.47)
(.43)

Ed= HS

1.22**

1.02**

1.14**

1.66**

(.17)

(.17)

(.16)

(.17)

(.60)

µ
Ed> HS

Constant

Ed= HS
(T

Ed> HS

3.66** 3.10**
(.19)
(.18)

Ed= HS
E

Ed> HS

1.18*

.05
(.57)

(.64)

.73
(.57)

2.81**

2.42**

2.51**

1.56**

(.21)

(.73)

.92
(.58)

1.57**

(.18)

(.65)

(.69)

3.48**

3_74**

3.6o**

3.89**

4.48**

4.83**

5_30**

5_19**

(.14)

(.13)

(.13)

(.13)

(.46)

(.43)

(.43)

(.39)

.04
(.15)

-.46**

(.15)

.47
(.56)

-.68
(.49)

.42
(.59)

-.06
(.63)

-.43
(.51)

.45
(.59)

.68
(.63)

1.08**
(.17)

Constant

.65**

-.36**

.68**
(.16)

-.28**
(.14)

(.15)
.66**

.51**
(.16)

(.18)

1.06
(.67)

.913**

.921**

.948**

.951 **

.689**

_752**

.824**

.843**

(.012)

(.010)

(.009)

(.008)

(.041)

(.037)

(.031)

(.032)

.016
(.014)

.031**

.023**

.018**

.089*

(.011)

(.010)

(.009)

(.049)

.040
(.044)

.062
(.039)

.045
(.040)

-.028*

-.006
(.012)

-.003
(.011)

-.029**

.059
(.053)

(.043)

(.015)

(.012)

*coefficient significant at the .10 level.
**coefficient significant at the .05 level.

34

_131**

.068*
(.040)

_091**
(.040)

Table 3:

Trends and differentials in the proportions unemployed (U) and the log earnings (E) among
blacks and whites. (Data are drawn from the 1968-1986 March Current Population Surveys;
ordinary least squares estimates; t-statistics in parentheses.)

A. 20-24 year-olds
.!.Qg_ g

!!
Males

Females

Males

Females

.0428**
(2.49)

.0247
(1.21)

9.10**

9.45**

(306)

(169)

Race= Black

.0296
(1.44)

.0246
(1.01)

-.0104
(-0.27)

-.054
(-0.80)

Ed< HS

.0247
(1.20)

.0666**
(2.73)

-.123**
(-3.24)

-.388**

-.0067
(-0.32)

.0055
(0.23)

.0155
(-0.41)

-.135**

-.221**

Intercept

Ed= HS

Race X Ed<HS

.0948**

(-5.80)

(-2.02)

-.0382
(-1.31)

(2.75)

(-4.22)

-.0371
(-0.39)

Race X Ed=HS

-.0182
(-0.63)

.0244
(0.71)

-.144**
(-2.68)

.0035
(-0.04)

Race x Time

.0011**
(3.73)

.0076**
(3.37)

-.0019**

(-2.26)

.0001
(0.01)

Ed<HS X Time

.0085**
(4.47)

.0062**
(2.77)

-.0058*
(-1.66)

.0056
(0.91)

Ed=HS X Time

.0039**
(2.07)

.0025
(1.12)

-.0051
(-1.46)

-.0001
(-0.02)

Race X Ed< HS X Time

.0051 *
(1.91)

-.0008
(-0.25)

.0037
(0.74)

.0027
(0.31)

Race X Ed=HS X Time

.0010
(0.38)

.0003
(0.09)

.0027
(0.54)

-.0029
(-0.34)

.934

.932

.981

.955

R2
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Table 3 (cont'd): Trends and differentials in the proportions unemployed (U) and the log earnings (E)
among blacks and whites. (Data are drawn from the 1968-1986 March Current Population
Surveys; ordinary least squares estimates; t-statistics in parentheses.)

B. 25-29 year-olds

.!.29. .!;_

!l.
Males

Females

Males

Females

.0153
(1.10)

.0239
(1.30)

10.06**

9.78**

(340)

(295)

-.0078
(-0.47)

-.0049
(-0.22)

-.185**

-.0315
(-0.79)

.0269
(1.62)

.0445**

-.263**
(-7.41)

-.457**

(2.02)

Ed= HS

-.0064
(-0.39)

.0150
(0.68)

-.121 **
(-3.40)

-.241 **
(-6.07)

Race X Ed<HS

-.0085
(-0.36)

.0071
(0.23)

-.119**
(-2.37)

-.111**
(-3.04)

Race X Ed=HS

.0275
(1.17)

.0085
(0.27)

-.0114
(-0.23)

-.0626
(-1.11)

.0058**

Intercept

Race= Black

Ed< HS

Race X Time

Ed<HS X Time

Ed=HS X Time

Race X Ed< HS X Time

Race X Ed=HS X Time

R2

.0064**

(-5.23)

(-11.5)

(4.18)

(2.83)

.0013
(0.39)

-.0051
(-1.39)

.0062**
(4.04)

.0056**

-.0068**

(2.77)

(-2.09)

-.0001
(-0.04)

(2.49)

.0017
(0.84)

-.0005
(-0.16)

.0016
(0.44)

.0020
(0.91)

.0047
(1.61)

.0020
(0.44)

(2.43)

-.0015
(-0.67)

.0014
(0.47)

-.0017
(-0.36)

.0067
(1.29)

.929

.899

.986

.986

.0038**

*coefficient significant at the .10 level.
**coefficient significant at the .05 level.
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Figure 5
Percentages Never-Marrying by Age 30
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TITLES FOR FIGURES 1-6

Figure 1. The Coale-McNeil marriage model: Sample model schedules.

Figure 2. Ratio of males of a given age (x+2) to females two years younger (x) in 1980. (Data are
adusted for underenumeration.)

Figure 3. Ratio of the number of male births in a given year (t) to the number of female births two years
later (t+2). (Births are adjusted for underregistration.)

Figure 4. Annual probabilities of first marriage classified by whether an individual was employed full-time
year-round or had experienced some spell either unemployed or involuntarily out of the labor force in the
prior year. (Data pertain to the 1979 Youth Cohort of the National Longitudinal Surveys of Labor Market
Experience.)

Figure 5. Percentage of never-married teenage women (initially observed at single years of age 14 through
19) who married by age 30, classified by whether a woman had an out-of-wedlock birth in the year of age
at which a woman was initially observed.

(Data are from Cycle Ill of the National Survey of Family

Growth.)

Figure 6. Percentage of women aged 15-19 through 40-44 in 1982 who ever had a premarital first birth,
classified by a woman's mother's educational level. (Data are from Cycle Ill of the National Survey of
Family Growth.)
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